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POLITICAL PARTY AS A DERIVATIVE OF THE TV SHOW IN CONTEMPORARY UKRAINE: CULTURAL TECHNOLOGY OF IMAGE VERSUS IDEOLOGY

The author analyzed the TV show "Servant of the People" and how it influenced the functioning process of political parties in Ukraine through the prism of the correlation of ideological and technological practices in the TV show. The methodology of the study is based not on the analysis of the content of political programs and organizations, but on the logic of hierarchies and transformations of cultural practices. The main marker of the dominance of technology over ideology in the 2019 presidential elections in Ukraine was the fact that a political party is created with the same name after it became clear that the success of the show ensured the victory of the protagonist's representative in the elections.

Mass media is a form of cultural power of an ever-expanding group of educated people. It combines the elements of ideology and technology of image. The historical dynamics of the mass media demonstrates several historical stages in this process. The first stage is the print media: the text-centrism of this media creates an ideological dominant for unifying into large enough groups of people at the cost of the regulative idea of rational discourse. The decentralization of political positions, represented as variety of political parties, is carried out as rational criticism. The second stage is optical media (cinema and television): the circulation of images from this period creates a positive emotional connection to the political leader beyond the mediations of the rational bureaucracy. The dramaturgical style of media criticism does not assume an active position of a rational subject, but a passive mass viewer, who expresses an evaluative position on professionally produced images, including images of the political sphere. The technology of image production dominates the ideological narrative. The third stage is the reproduction of optical media in Internet practices. Here the simplification of production and circulation, of discourse and image, leads to a new level of immediacy in the connection between the political leader and his voters, on the one hand. On the other hand, the political, as well as other elite spheres, are beginning to lose their privileged status in the democratization of cultural capital production. Internet media suggest a de-differentiation of image and discourse, ideology and technology of image. There is a certain imbalance towards the production of images above narrative.

Keywords: political party, Ukraine, TV show, technology, ideology, image, mass media.

Formulation of the problem. The process of turning politics into a spectacle and a show has already become the commonplace in humanitarian discourse since the days of Guy Debord. The representation of political processes in mass media cannot but influence them. The understanding of politics in the opposition logic of vocation and profession correlates with media reality, since the charismatic nature of the leader in many ways becomes a product of it. The exploration of the construction logic of politics in the context of mass-media transformations has been pursued by the researchers such as Max Weber, Jean Baudrillard, Pierre Bourdieu, Alvin Gouldner, John A. Hall, Stuart Hall, Friedrich Kittler, Niklas Luhmann.

Analysis of research and publications. The correlation between ideology and technology has become one of the basic questions in understanding the political sphere inasmuch as the construction of reality in the age of mass media correlates with the reality of construction, the interaction of which actually generates a "surplus of communicative possibilities" [15, c. 2]. The correlation problem between ideology and technology is described in many works. The basic studies for this article in this context are the works of Herbert Marcuse, Jürgen Habermas, Jorge Larraín, Scott Lash, John Thompson.

The emergence of TV show was an important stage in the formation of a new order of media reality. The TV show as a form of cultural production has been studied by the following theorists Cemiloğlu Altunay, Hakan Aşkan, Jonathan Gray, Jason Mittell, Miłosz Wojtyła.

Purpose of the article is to reveal how the TV show "Servant of the People" influenced the functioning process of political parties in Ukraine through the prism of the correlation of ideological and technological practices in this TV show. The methodology of the study is based not on the analysis of the content of political programs and organizations, but on the logic of hierarchies and transformations of cultural practices.

Exposition of the main material of the study. A secularized ideology as a product of the Enlightenment shared with him its belief in the cult of mind and "optimism...faith in human liberation" [13, c. 9-10]. Logocentrism suggests taking off the table many reality parameters that do not fit into its basic orientations. A. Gouldner emphasized that visual parameters of verbal communication reduce its rationality because they distract from the content by their "multimodality" and overload with its "irrelevant information". The scientific ideal of impartial knowledge could not function outside the order of print media, which "decontextualizes" irrelevant content: "This decontextualization can make appraisal of the validity of an argument more rigorous. It may allow it to be appraised somewhat more deliberately and impersonally, without pressure for the rapid rebuttal of contest-like conversation. Such distancing and depersonalization may, also, permit a greater control of affectivity thus, again, reinforcing a certain kind and measure of rationality" [7, c. 41]. Printed text, according to A. Gouldner, creates the following conditions for communication: distancing and depersonalization, greater control of affectivity. To this can be also added consistency, completeness, history of the present [4, c. 43], linearity. All of these characteristics give us a description of the transcendental subject rather than the living person, who is split in daily life by his desires and interests. Reading and writing can be produced in silence, apart from others by an inner voice, the voice of the mind itself. The printed word claims a universal meaning beyond the specific intentions of the one who wrote it. Nevertheless, the content and even more the truthfulness of the ideas the one must distinguish from their ability to unite people: "The emergence of newspapers and the 'reading public' has made them carriers and distributors of ideology. And although the influence of ideas sometimes depends on their actual content, more important is their power to unite people in a community" [11, c. 131]. As M. Weber noted mass parties emerge in the course of professionalization and bureau-

cratization of the political process. An important element of the latter is the press as a tool of influencing the maximum number of voters. The phenomenon of populism emerges (the basic tendencies of populism in Ukrainian society were analyzed by the Ukrainian scholar M. Rohozha [16, c. 50]). But not journalism as such, but print media are sources of political influence, M. Weber emphasized: "for all modern states, apparently the journalist worker gains less and less as the capitalist lord of the press, of the sort of 'Lord' Northcliffe, for instance, gains more and more political influence" [19, c. 20].

Beyond the logic of mediatization, the enlightened cult of public knowledge application loses its social and technological context. J. Thompson's understanding of the text-centrism of Western civilization and its connection with media technology was vividly demonstrated: "We can broadly conceive of the emergence of mass communication in terms of the gradual establishment of a range of institutions based on certain technical means of cultural transmission, and orientated towards the large-scale production and generalized diffusion of commodified symbolic forms. The earliest forms of mass communication were based on techniques of printing and on the use of printed paper as a means of transmission. The key developments in this regard were those commonly associated with the goldsmith from Mainz, Johann Gutenberg, who invented a method for the replica-casting of metal letters and who adapted the traditional screw press to the purposes of manufacturing printed texts. By the end of the fifteenth century, printing presses had been set up in the major trading centers throughout Europe and the era of mass communication had begun" [18, c. 14].

In a different way than science, ideology frees people from their problems, on the grounds that they are private. It offers a set of ready-made, generalized solutions in which particulars no longer matter. But these unified solutions have no single center. The decentralization of discourse at the level of the printed mass-media has already fundamentally destroyed the unified way of legitimizing the image of the world that was basic to monotheism: "With the spread of literacy, it became possible and necessary for elites to ensure that these new publics would support their policies, or, at least, remain neutral to them. The decentralized structure of the printing industry also made public support (or neutrality) a necessity since the public might be reading the opposition press and be mobilized by opposing forces" [7, c. 40], thought A. Gouldner.

S. Hall believed that the concept of technique in high culture, especially in art, is linked to the logic of the production of an object, whereas in the cultural industry it is aimed at the standardization of consumption, that is, the production of a man. If the technicality of text production can be traced since the 15th century, then optical media, which is associated with the production of emotional sphere, remains largely in the sphere of manual labor, essentially a sphere of craft, until the 19th century. It has changed the situation radically.

As mediums that are oriented toward the management of emotional balance in the sphere of ideas production form – science and ideology – become the sphere of elite culture, which trains professionals for all spheres, including the mass media. And in this mediated way, elite culture continues to manage mass culture, which is focused on the production of presence rather than on the production of meaning. It is more accurate to say that the production of meaning becomes subordinated to the production of presence. J. Habermas thesis explains that the dominant role of

science as a form of ideology ended in the 19th century. In this respect, J. Habermas continued the thought of the older representative of the Frankfurt School H. Marcuse, about "hidden ideology" because by liberating the man, technology itself becomes a means of ideology. The problem of the correlation between purposive rational action and technical development is one of the central ones in the humanitarian discourse of the twentieth century.

This H. Marcuse's thought about hidden ideology can be explained by the relationship between narrative and image. First of all, the possibilities of technical reproduction of entertainment, which in the era of optical and auditory mass-media has got a new scale, have become important and the latter one itself has become self-referential [15, c. 10], according to N. Luhmann. He considered the novel, in which the artistic image is derived from the narrative, as a form of such entertainment, but on a new scale compared to the aesthetic delight of the fine arts. In the classical cultural industry [14, c. 4] (Scott Lash's term), ideology as a structure of values has become derivative of the images represented by optical media. This has led to the overturning of the hierarchy of cultural practices, at the head of which was the production and consumption of text. But the ideology itself, having received the image as the main means of expression, has also changed. It has become "hidden", derivative, multi-linear, directed at the emotional sphere, and therefore less closed, less consequent, based not on the logical connectivity of ideas, but on the play of signifier and signified.

Twentieth-century casualness replicated the images of the film industry more zealously, rather than trying to build a logical argument while influencing the masses. The Geoculture's dream of Enlightenment as for healing society with the light of mind was realized in the twentieth century through the light of the film projector.

Rationally verified system of ideas continues to exist and even to improve, but in more closed communities of professionals. J. Habermas emphasizes that Weber's concept of rationalization cannot be applied to a later type of society. "The liberating power of rationalization" [9, c. 81] in the twentieth century was greatly supplemented (and then supplanted) by the image of industry, which made its own adjustments to the order of social organization, above all in the process of de-differentiation of the social and the cultural. The dream factories were aimed at strategies of rationalization only in the logic of commercial success. And this was not always the case.

An important organizing point in the mass production of images by optical media [12, c. 3] (Friedrich Kittler) is that in visual culture presence is going beyond the sphere of body interaction (coercion, even in the form of disciplinary practices of early Modernity, or grooming) and is performed within the community as emotional fulfillment. The "depoliticized public realm" [5, c. 3] and even the "end of the social" [5, c. 37] (J. Baudrillard) are generally connected not only with the next crisis of argumentation and the dominance of instrumental rationality, but also with the fact that the delight of the image replaces the "The Pleasure of the Text" [4, c. 2] (Roland Barthes). A. Gouldner believes that the masses are those for whom ideology matters less. In this sense he contrasts the "cultural apparatus" (intellectual institutions: universities, schools, museums, theaters) versus the "industry of consciousness". If the apparatus of culture is a source of bad news, their analysis is aimed at identifying environmental crises, political corruption and other dangers – the industry of culture/ industry of consciousness (there is no distinction between these concepts

here) is a "professional observer of the bright sides. (In this context, it should be noted that the comic genre of the TV show served as a positive packaging for its social critique.) In this perspective, the heir of optimism Enlightenment was precisely the cultural industry. Not as a progressive belief in a brighter future based on the cult of the mind, but as the heir of a positive emotional mood.

At the same time, since the cultural industry is still a professional sphere, it needs education and, therefore, rationalization. It is interesting to note that the TV show "Club for the Funny and Resourceful" from which began Zelensky's career in the media sphere, was in some way a product of university education. In the Soviet Union and in post-Soviet countries, university teams created such a competition, which was picked up by television and gained not only popularity with viewers, but also a high level of professionalism. The political phenomenon of V. Zelensky is derived from the fact that he came out of the sphere of mass-media professionals and their skills to speak to the electorate in the language of video images.

A. Gouldner stressed that viewer experience, which is derived not from the linguistic but from the pictorial means of communication, produces not rational but dramatic criticism: "A viewer's participatory experience, when intellectualized at all, implies a dramaturgical criticism of an object to be consumed and experienced. Dramaturgical criticism does not prod a viewer to do something or change something, but simply to "appreciate" something in its givenness. The viewer Revolution presented with a negative dramaturgical criticism of something is not expected to produce a better showing, but to better "understand" it, to recommend others view or avoid viewing it, and to look forward to or avoid the next production by the same dramaturgist. Ideology implies rational criticism as preparation for action; dramaturgy implies the cultivation of the viewer's sensibility as the passive spectator of events as presented" [7, c. 169-170]. This dramatic criticism is derived from the consumption of images and became a new form of human production as passive viewer rather than as an actor of social action. For the viewer, viewing itself is a major social action and, if this tendency is consolidated, a political act as well. The passivity of the viewer's perception, as basic social characteristic, was noted by French researcher J. Baudrillard.

An important moment in the formation of the cultural industry was the emergence of such new media as radio, newsreel and television which provided contact of the heads of government with the people beyond the logic of bureaucratic institutions mediation and professional expert communities. In the twentieth century the coming to power of such new charismatic leaders as Theodore Roosevelt and Adolf Hitler is a derivative from their opportunities to influence the audience outside the bureaucratic apparatus as well. The moment of necessity to possess a new means of publicity for the leader of the nation is well illustrated in the British film "The King's Speech".

The emergence of private radio and television channels finally shook the state monopoly on mass media. Therefore, there was an escalation of the pluralism popular content, as well as its de-rationalization due to the appearance of new means of expression (intonation – radio, domination of image over discourse – cinema and television). In the Soviet Union the state monopoly over the sphere of mass media was so complete and unproblematic that Soviet bureaucratic system continued to control it as a means of producing ideology. Whereas the cultural industry had its own specific management of the culture sphere. This is one of the reasons for the defeat of

the Soviet Union in the Cold War, the end of which put the last point in the external confrontation of ideologies. This confrontation was outwardly ideological, but the information war of this period was not only about the rational criticism of discourses. The management of politics as refracted through mass-media in the stage of classical cultural industries led in the United States to the success of politicians who had come from the media sphere (such as Ronald Reagan and Arnold Schwarzenegger).

Further shift in the relationship between ideology and technology occurred in the sphere of the Internet. Through the de-differentiation of the production of symbolic products (no longer so much ideas as images, since the hierarchy has already been overturned) and the material infrastructures of information technology, the very production of emotions is becoming individualized. Technical and optical media of the new generation make it so easy to produce, distribute and consume images that it can be done by almost anyone who owns a smartphone. The monopoly (in particular of professional film studios and TV channels, in Soviet and post-Soviet countries – states) in the process of image production is finally being lost. New forms of platform monopoly are emerging, though, as elections around the world show. These are the trends of the "the global cultural industry" [14, c. 4] (S. Lash's term), unlike "the classical cultural industry". The global dimension becomes not only and not so much the sphere of international relations (which is now undergoing various and intensive transformations) as the de-differentiation of technology – the telephone, personal computer and the camera. An important new dimension of globalization is also the de-differentiation of image and text in Internet practices. Here, the possibility of textual commentary in the global cultural industry has become a substantial form, significantly overcoming the passivity of visual perception in the era of the classical cultural industry. Nevertheless, the dominance of the image continues. As the easier form of image consumption and interactivity in the production of images provides its leadership.

In general, the emergence and accessibility of Internet resources generates the new form of attitude immediacy to the political sphere. Outside the hierarchy of institutions and states, anyone can not only read or view a politician's personal message, but also comment on it. This gives rise to a new technologically and culturally framed form of emotional intimacy between the political leader and a person. On the other hand, politicians no longer look like celestials who ritually show themselves to voters on certain dates and again disappear into the mysterious significance and pathos of their elitist surroundings. The pathos and social distance in Internet practices is greatly reduced. This closeness of the political sphere and everyday life could not but impact the possibility of circulating images of persons from different social spheres.

After the appearance of mass access to personal screens, which sociologists attribute to the affordability of smartphones after 2012, this trend has increased even more. There has been a democratization not only of the consumption of cultural products, but also of their production. This could not but influence the political sphere. In the top hundred of the best bloggers in Ukraine, 11 places are taken by politicians (A. Shariy (2.41 million subscribers on YouTube), such a large number for a pro-Russian blogger shows that he has a wide audience and rather not in Ukraine), V. Zelensky (648 thousand), J. Sokolova (292 thousand), A. Lugansky (243 thousand), A. Arestovich (130 thousand), P. Poroshenko (70 thousand) and

V. Klitschko (70 thousand). Such a high politicization of the new media proves the instability of democracy. In more stable countries, for example, in the U.S., as a rule, the first hundred bloggers include one or two politicians. Though it must be said that the number of bloggers' subscribers in Ukraine who are not in the political sphere significantly exceeds the best results of politicians. In such way, the super-champion of Ukrainian blogosphere Alyona Venum – 5.5 million subscribers – is a classic of post-modern everyday life. It should be noted that most of the channels listed (including A. Venum, except P. Poroshenko) are Russian speaking. Even modest in global scale, Ukrainian information production exceeds previous forms of cultural production. The problem of information management in conditions of its overproduction remains open.

It also should be noted, that in the Internet sphere, search engine optimization algorithms create individual content. Therefore, generalizations of content ideas in general become difficult to make. Even if two people have watched two identical videos, but in different sequences, with different modes of engagement and different scales of interiorization of it, the form of subjectivity derived from the hierarchy of cultural practices will also be different. Consequently, the generalization of ideas (necessary for the practice of ideology) and much less complex political ideas, is not achieved on the basis of Internet practices.

Free access (especially in Ukraine) to the consumption of images after the era of non-commercial television (and in post-Soviet countries there has never been such a period) immediately included the image order into the logic of political tasks. There is a crisis of authoritarian regimes (as the experience of Belarus has shown) with the mass use of smartphones.

The late Modern feminist movement formulated the thesis that "the personal is political" [10, c. 119], according to S. Hall. This is a new dimension of the "The Fall of Public Man" [17, c. 2] (Richard Sennett) and is related to the fact that in the sphere of political discourse of the liberal model of democracy new themes appeared: family, sex, raising children, etc. Such issues have overshadowed the classic issues of ideology – class struggle and national competition. In the process of the liquefaction of the ideological component in the political parties of modern Ukraine, the shift in meaning occurred even further: the political is personal.

Ukraine, like other post-Soviet countries, is characterized by high level of corruption. It leads to the fact that the replacement of public by private, accompanied by a lower level of autonomy of the political in relation to the economic. The presence of less authoritarian regimes in Ukraine than in other post-Soviet countries also reduces the importance of a consistent ideological component of power. Therefore, the diversity of Ukrainian political parties is related not to the elaborateness and thoughtfulness of their ideological agenda, but to situational economic alliances. Parties are personified and even named after the leader who heads such an economic alliance. The name of the party is usually associated with the names of leaders in the absence of ideological guidelines: the Petro Poroshenko's Bloc, the Yulia Tymoshenko's Bloc, the Viktor Medvedchuk's movement. Even the very definition of a party disappears from the name of the main political forces in Ukraine. Political movements are a form of legitimization of economic interests. The maximum distinction of regional interests marks the position of the leaders. The oligarchs' purchase of a party labels leads to the fact that there are no parties competing, but different representations of the rent hierarchy of a region given. The

post-Soviet tendency "the political is personal" continues and amplifies the European tendency "the personal is political". There is no need here in a discourse, which adequately reflects the basic tendencies of development, but a pre-reflexive ritual which does not prevent the system from reproducing itself. Politicians change, but "politics" does not. The very "demand for new faces" is a manifestation of the crisis of ideological discourse and the political sphere's reliance on political technologies.

The representation of political parties through the performance of persons also correlates with the tendency of politics implementation as a spectacle, the shift of Ukrainian politics from the sphere of ideology to the sphere of political technology. Therefore, the demand for "new faces" naturally actualizes persons from the media sphere. In Ukrainian politics, the success of media-persons was first fixed by sportsman V. Klitschko, who was twice elected as mayor of the Ukrainian capital. V. Zelensky's victory in the elections showed that Ukraine is moving in this direction. The innovation of V. Zelensky was that he participated in the creation of the TV show as a new type of political technology.

The genres of Ukrainian soap opera are quite stable: a rare detective breaks the tight rows of melodramas in Ukrainian TV show content. And although the form of cultural production on a global scale has surpassed the audience of housewives long ago, nevertheless the Ukrainian TV show as a whole is still, sadly enough, at the stage of a soap opera. All the more interesting is the phenomenon of the TV show "Servant of the People", which became a kind of ramp for the presidential campaign of V. Zelensky.

Ukrainian political analysts called this TV show the most expensive electoral video. The TV show's slogan hinted at this as well: "The Story of the Next President. But such a disguise did not help the representatives of the Ukrainian legislation to recognize the TV show as a form of agitation: the third season of the show was shown a few days before the presidential election. It became not only commercially successful (only on the YouTube channel of "95th Kvartal" the TV show was watched 12 million times, the rights for broadcasting the TV show were bought by Russian, Estonian and Kazakh TV channels, as well as Netflix), but also started a new (for Ukraine definitely) effect of political technology.

Some Ukrainian political analysts doubt the success of the show as an electoral project. For example, V. Paniotto, referred to the data of sociological surveys of the Kiev International Institute of Sociology, which he heads. He said that 54% of the Ukrainians questioned said that they voted for V. Zelensky because he answered the demand for new faces [1], and not because they had watched the TV show. The latter as the decisive importance of the TV show for voting is noted only by 6% of Ukrainians. The Director of Sociological Institute also believes that a big factor in the success of the current president of Ukraine was his participation in political shows of the "95th Kvartal" studio. This very fact has not only fixed his status of a competent expert in the political sphere but also as a tough critic of the existing political system and a fighter for justice. One can agree to a certain extent with these statements, which are shared by the majority of other Ukrainian political scientists and sociologists (A. Bychenko and others). But would Zelenski's election be successful based only on his media status without the TV show?

The most de-differentiated forms of such Internet media (like memes) lose much of their meaning in the process of intensity of consumption as derived from the speed of circulation, which is extra-personal (like jokes). Whereas the

TV show worked not just as author's work, but as Zelensky's replacement of the entire authorial team of the show. There was an identification of the main character not with the viewer himself, but with a type of political leadership. The success of this step, the achievement of the goal through the means of the cultural industry, actually makes the TV show a political technology.

Of course, this does not mean that you can take any person and film a similar TV show with him and then you can expect the same effect in elections. If V. Zelensky was no longer a media persona, and not just a media persona, but someone who was positioned as a competent expert in the field of politics, who carried out satirical criticism of politics for a couple of decades. What is happening here is the substitution of entertainment activity for professionalism in the political sphere at the expense of the commonality of topics. A Substitution is the derivative of the de-differentiation of the discourse fields and image in the media landscape. Professional activity implies thematization of the topic through the acquisition of a number of competences in it. The media sphere implies thematization of a topic on the basis of skills in the media sphere itself. The semantic shift occurs because of the blurring of meanings in the logic of the organization of media sphere itself. The identification of a person with a role has arisen in other cultures as well, but has the role of the actor been converted into the same role in reality?

The answer to this question requires more detailed study. I would like only to note one more important point: only after President V. Zelensky was elected it was possible for his party to win the parliamentary elections and even create a coalition on its basis ("Servant of the People", "Opposition Platform – For Life", "Homeland", "European Solidarity" and "Golos"). Moreover, the party "Servants of the People" was created in December 2017 as a necessary stage of Zelensky's participation in the elections. The fact that the party is created for a certain person in Ukraine is a well-established phenomenon. But the fact that the party is derived not only from the person, but also from the success of the TV show as a political technology is a new stage in the transformation of the political sphere on the way from ideology to political technology. As demonstrated by the ambivalence of the very ideological formulation of the "Servant of the People" party: "Ukrainian centrism is a political ideology in Ukraine, which foresees the search for a compromise between different groups of the population" [2]. The myth of a man of the people, a simple teacher who was able to defeat political corruption became what united 73, 16 percent of the votes.

An important point in the success of this political technology was that the TV show is a form of visualized, but narrative. Visualization let remake textuality [8], as J. Gray, J. Mittell showed. These researchers (C. Altunay, H. Aşkan [3], M. Wojtyna [20]) stressed how the cultural practice narrative turn utopia into dystopia. Moreover, it is the most perfect form of grand narrative under circumstance crisis of grand narratives.

What's more, there are no other cultural products (other than literature) of the Postmodern in which such a great plot could develop. Therefore, the basic success framework of all TV show is a good literary basis. But in general, when a TV show is successfully adapted, it transcends the plot logic of its literary origin.

But the whole narrative basis of the TV show is genetically close to its textual source. And so the show is not a meme that has so few letters. Still, its potential for dramaturgical criticism proved to be sufficient for the commonal-

ity of Willingness among Ukrainian voters in the 2019 presidential elections.

Conclusion. Mass media is a form of cultural power of an ever-expanding group of educated people. It combines the elements of ideology and technology of image. The historical dynamics of the mass media demonstrates several historical stages in this process. The first stage is the print media: the text-centrism of this media creates an ideological dominant for unifying into large enough groups of people at the cost of the regulative idea of rational discourse. The decentralization of political positions, represented as variety of political parties, is carried out as rational criticism. The second stage is optical media (cinema and television): the circulation of images from this period creates a positive emotional connection to the political leader beyond the mediations of the rational bureaucracy. The dramaturgical style of media criticism does not assume an active position of a rational subject, but a passive mass viewer, who expresses an evaluative position on professionally produced images, including images of the political sphere. The technology of image production dominates the ideological narrative. The third stage is the reproduction of optical media in Internet practices. Here the simplification of production and circulation, of discourse and image, leads to a new level of immediacy in the connection between the political leader and his voters, on the one hand. On the other hand, the political, as well as other elite spheres, are beginning to lose their privileged status in the democratization of cultural capital production. Internet media suggest a de-differentiation of image and discourse, ideology and technology of image. There is a certain imbalance towards the production of images above narrative. Ukraine, due to the specifics of its cultural practices hierarchy, has demonstrated the success of the political technology of the TV show as a means of winning the presidential election. The TV show becomes the optimal form of visualization of the political narrative, which conforms to the following characteristics: the political remains the main topic; the dominance of entertainment rather than direct agitation; a certain length of the narrative, which ensures the logical coherence of the visualized discourse; no monopoly over the production and broadcast of this type of cultural product, based on the technology of watching on the individual screen, which allows to maximize the audience; a balance of critical component and positive form of emotional perception, which is provided by the comedy genre; sufficiency of dramaturgical criticism as a form of ambition for voting. The main marker of the dominance of technology over ideology in the 2019 presidential elections in Ukraine is becoming the fact that a political party is created with the same name after it became clear that the success of the TV show ensured the victory of the protagonist's representative in the elections.

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ПОЛІТИЧНА ПАРТІЯ ЯК ПОХІДНА СЕРІАЛУ В СУЧАСНІЙ УКРАЇНІ: КУЛЬТУРНА ТЕХНОЛОГІЯ ОБРАЗУ ПРОТИ ІДЕОЛОГІЇ

У статті проаналізовано значення серіалу "Слуга народу" як зразка нових медіа та його впливу на процес функціонування політичних партій в Україні крізь призму співвідношення ідеологічної та технологічної складової практик образу. Методологія дослідження базується не на аналізі змісту політичних програм та організацій, а на логіці ієрархії і трансформацій культурних практик. Основним маркером домінування технології над ідеологією на президентських виборах в Україні 2019 року стало те, що політична партія з тотожною назвою створюється після того, як стало зрозуміло, що успіх серіалу забезпечив перемогу того, хто грав головного героя, на виборах.

Ключові слова: політична партія, Україна, серіал, технології, образ, ідеологія, ЗМІ.